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Abstract
This chapter analyses the dynamics of economic reform mechanisms and
their potential failures using a “soft” Bayes-Nash co-ordinated
implementation. The methodological results are applied to the case of
Estonia in the period 1987-2006.  Through this example, the model
analyses types and subperiods of the reform period and characterises
the most significant reform mechanism failures. In the theoretical
section, the problems of co-ordinated, adaptive and approximate
implementation mechanisms of socially desirable economic reform are
discussed. It is shown that rigorous long-run implementation in Nash
equilibrium is almost surely impossible in the traditional non-co-
ordinated and non-dictatorial sense. First of all, the social preferences
may not conform to preferences of the non-co-operative agents when
there are information asymmetries. Second, the social preferences are
adaptive or not motionless in the highly uncertain environment and also
the implementing mechanisms are adaptively changing. Thus, it is more
rational to discuss the extended co-ordinated mechanisms (game rules)
and admissible implementation errors and to study the properties of these
quasi-implementing mechanisms. These models may be useful as a
complementary tool for the design of reforms of the economic
institutional structures.
On the basis of the described theoretical analysis, we make some
remarks regarding the Estonian economic reforming mechanism types
and their sub-periods in the period 1987-2006 and comment on their
short- and long-run failures .
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1.   Introduction
Economic institutions and structures are the outcomes of the design
process for reforming systems. Thus, to understand more adequately the
processes of economic reforms, we have first of all to understand the
dynamic changes in the types of the reforming systems (meta-systems)
and their characteristics.
At the moment, it seems that the closest “hard” (rigorous
mathematical) theory to analyse the types of dynamic institutional
designing systems is the Bayesian-Nash co-ordinated implementation
theory where the implementation of the socially desirable reform is
modelled as an extended mathematical game with incomplete
information, co-ordination and side payments (Ennuste, 2001).
 However, that theory presents a difficulty in that it is
mathematically extremely complicated and so far only very few
mathematically “nice” special cases have been elaborated on, mainly
for static social choice correspondence models of markets and with
very simple mechanisms in Nash equilibrium (Tatamitani, 2002). But
“ugly characteristics such as complementaries of designs and
flexibility of reforms in the face of new information are also required
for the really adequate social choice reform design models. Extended
models with co-ordination of the private utilities and social values are
also needed to represent the true reform process. In the case of the
latter models, the rigorous mathematical approach is not permissive
(Matsushima, 1993) or it is mathematically clumsy and inconvenient.
In the following, we will overcome this obstacle by taking a “soft”
implementation theoretic approach: meaning we will apply, according to
Bates et al. (1998), analytical verbal narratives in the theoretical and
methodological discussion and in the empirical case analysis based on
3the principles and rhetoric of implementation theory1. Verbal narratives
principles and terms borrowed from non-market public choice theories
and design problem analyses are blended with ideas from the economic
sequential equilibrium theory.
In our approach, we limit ourselves to certain classes of
institutional reforms that are mainly connected with evolutionary
adaptive transitions from centralised to the decentralised types of
systems and the co-ordinated dynamic mechanism of quasi-
implementing economic institutions in an environment of high
uncertainty and asymmetric information.
As a relevant case study, we use this methodology to analyse sub-
periods of different mechanism types in the Estonian reform system in
the period 1987-2006.
The paper is organised as follows. In the second section, we
describe the theoretical principles of relevant co-ordinative
implementation theory under asymmetric information. Next, we offer
some methodological analytical remarks. This is followed by a
presentation of an empirical case study to explain some reform
mechanism failures mainly during the transition period in Estonia. The
paper concludes with a few modest proposals.
2.  Theoretical Remarks
With economic reforming systems, we consider the set of relevant
agents and their interaction mechanism, the latter consisting of
strategy space and outcome function on this space. Under the reforms,
we consider the changes in the economic institution structure. The
economic theory with these elements has many novelties in new
implications.
First, some extra-market agents whose strategic behaviour is
connected with the development of economic institutional systems are
integrated into the theory. There are the parliament, the government, the
central bank, ministries, lobby groups, non-governmental organisations,
labour unions etc. Consequently, the implementation model includes
heterogeneous agents, non-co-operative, and co-ordinative.
The second implication is that the complication of the system
reorganisation makes it impossible to implement reforms in one-step and
in short-range designs. In this way, studies should examine the
sequential nature of these processes, and the problem of sequencing the
decision about systems, and especially the adaptivity and flexibility of
the designs. We use the term adaptivity here to mean that new
4information is incorporated in the path-dependent decision-making.
Another important issue arises here. This is the question of additional
transitional uncertainties connected with the reforms in the economic
systems. The study of these processes in the context of deterministic or
complete information models may give completely distorted results.
In the traditional implementation theory (e.g. Vartiainen, 1999;
Tatamitani, 2002), a mechanism implements a social choice rule or
function if there is a unique equilibrium in the Nash game of all agents
with the outcome equivalent to the outcome of the social choice rule.
If we turn now to adaptive implementation, we have social choice
decisions in the form of partly preliminary path variables and sequential-
ly the previous decisions and plans are corrected (Ennuste, 2001).
Demanding the strict implementation results to these decisions is not
adequate to the reality and not reasonable. In other words, in the adaptive
treatment, the social choice function and the implementation function are
partly unknown and the condition of their equivalence is not applicable.
A convenient implementation criterion may be based on
Marschak's maximum possible error idea (Source) or on the probable
movement in the direction of the quasi-gradients of the social choice
rule. We use here the following quasi-implementation criterion: the
mechanism in each period is implementing if it is most likely to take full
steps in the right direction.
The study of such implementation criteria says that the traditional
theory’s social choice function is no longer crucial for the
implementation. Rather, the crucial factor is that the implementing
mechanism should work in the limits of possible maximum errors or in
the right directions (quasi-gradients) based on the existing information.
In the light of these points, we describe the processes of sequential
economic systems. This is a two-stage Bayes-Nash model with
heterogeneous agents. In addition to common economic agents
(producers and consumers), there are also agents such as the parliament
and the government.
We argue that the social choice model should explicitly consider
the economic system design decisions, and the impact of certain
decisions on other agents design decisions as conditions or restrictions.
In fact, it is extremely difficult to integrate these designs into a rigorous
stochastic allocation model, where the dynamics are a vital aspect (one
example of such model is given in the last Chapter of this book). To
avoid these difficulties, we base our social choice model and the
deduction of its implementation system on heuristic assumptions and
procedures and on qualitative analysis.
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model of reform may be in the constrained setting (e.g. optimal planning
model) and to prepare this for the implementation analysis we have to,
first, transform it into relaxed form (with Lagrangean co-ordination and
in parallel introducing for the agents side constraints or quotas (Ennuste,
1978)). And second, we have to introduce a co-ordinating transfer
system for the agents to encourage truth-telling (Matsushima, 1993)2. In
other words, we have to introduce some kind of co-ordinative agents into
the implementation system to make it effective.
In the implementation mechanism, we consider that the information
of the agents in Bayes-Nash game is asymmetric and sequentially
changing. The announcements of the agents are strategic on the available
strategy space, meaning that they take into account that their choice of
policy will affect the expected behaviour of other agents who have some
influence on forming the system. In the case of preferences, we also have
to consider short- and long-term effects as ex ante and ex post effects.
Now the crucial problem is the adaptive implementation of the socially
desirable transitions. Is the implementation in some sense (in principle)
possible in democracy? Alternatively, are the uncertainties, asymmetries
and status quo biases too strong (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Dollar
and Svensson, 2000).
In fact, the ordinary (endogenous and exogenous) uncertainties are
supplemented with transitional uncertainties or magnified uncertainties.
These are due to the structural changes in the real economy and in the
economic system and ultimately in the reforming system. The new
completely different market-economic information flows and their rapid
changes are for many incompetent agents and individuals not absorbable
and cause anxieties, especially in the ethnic minority groups (Ott and
Ennuste, 1996).
In effect, the agents are not capable of learning from some
conventional sources of their information. E.g. in the period of structural
changes the macro-econometric models loose their credibility, because
in these models the assumption of ceteris paribus also contains the fixed
economic structure. With these issues in mind, we pose the
implementation question in a different and more adequately relaxed
quasi perspective: the mechanism is quasi implementing when the errors
caused by some evident failures of the mechanism design (based on
hitherto known information) are in the admissible limits compared with
the socially desirable design or that the mechanism is probably
adaptively sufficiently moving in the socially desirable direction.
63. Methodological Remarks for Applied Implementation
Analyses
For application, it is rational to focus the analysis first of all on the most
central element of the reforming system ?  that is on the strategy space.
The structure of the available strategy space characterises the possible
activities of the agents and the co-ordination instruments active in the
system.
In the central planning of economic institutional structure, the
mechanism is a simple direct mechanism with command plans: the
strategy space for the agents is their private data space and they send
signals from this set to the centre and the centre gives to the agents the
directive institutional structure that may be modelled as central co-
ordination with quotas. As a rule, in the centralised command
mechanisms that are mainly functioning in the dictatorial political
environments, there is no need for the construction of truth-telling sub-
mechanisms to create the condition of self-selection or the fulfilment of
the truth-telling revelation principle. In other words, we assume that the
agents are here just behaving like automata and not as strategic players
in the decentralised systems. In the dictatorial systems, truth-telling and
following the command plan are expected to be imperative.
In the decentralised systems, the implementing mechanisms of
economic institutional structures are more complicated in range. First of
all, there should be in the strategy space an additional subset for co-
ordination of optimal self-selection by agents and another subset for the
co-ordination of the agents truth-telling. We solve implicitly this co-
ordination problem in the following by a simplifying assumption about
the correlation of agents types (information) that allows the construction
of a simple and credible truth-telling side-payment mechanism worked
out by Aoyagi (1998).
For simplification, we assume that in the reforming systems the
objective of the co-ordinating agents is to disseminate co-ordination
parameters that result in societal efficient design allocations. We
consider especially the mechanisms where the agents have expectations
of getting much additional information in the next period, and they are
even unsure about the future structure of the game mechanism that will
apply. It is easy to see that in this situation agents consider themselves to
be in greater risk situation and put more weight on the credibility and
reputation problems, including the reputation of the co-ordinating agent,
and therefore the heavily over-co-ordinated game may be even more
effective.
7Following our previous claim that properties of the design
mechanism strategy spaces are crucial for the adaptive implementation,
we formulate two necessary conditions for these spaces to be
implementive.
First, the strategy space may be implementive if it satisfies the
sufficient communicativeness conditions. The meaning and reasons
behind this condition are as follows. The social choice function is
working with information available for all the agents. Thus, to
implement social choice, it is assumed that the agents are "sincere and
obedient" and transmit their relevant private and co-ordinative
information to each other to work out the socially desirable solution
(Forges, 1990, and Ennuste, 1992). It is reasonable to assume that, in
order for the system to be implementive, the strategy space should be
sufficiently large and with adequate structure.
The communicativeness conditions may not be fulfilled e.g. in
cases of too aggregate data, or when the strategy space is not exploited
sufficiently by the agents through partial transmission of information etc.
Second, the mechanism may be implementive if it satisfies the
optimisation condition. The reasons behind this condition come from the
optimisation theory. The solution of social choice function is at the least
Pareto-optimal. This means that the implementing mechanism also has
to find Pareto-optimal solutions. The existence of Pareto optimality is
easy to verify by the experts.
The issue of whether these two conditions can be fulfilled in the
mechanism and the possibilities to eliminate the breaching factors are
still open questions and remain to be analysed in concrete
environments.
4. Estonian Economic Reforming Mechanism Types and
Failures in the Transformation in 1987-2006
4.1.  Specifications
The theoretical starting point in this section is that the type of
economic reforming system in applications is most convenient to
characterise by the types of its strategy spaces. In the following, we
use the probability measurements (located in the unit interval from 0
to 1) by expert assessments of the effective implementation of
theoretically available strategy spaces (sets of indicators) in the
mechanism as the types.
Two remarks are in order. First, the theoretically available
strategy spaces are nominally deduced from implementation theoretic
8remarks given in the previous sections. The available socially
desirable volumes of these sets (cardinal numbers) are assessed by the
experts.
Secondly, the assessed probability values of effective strategy
implementations we define as levels to what extent these available
volumes of strategy spaces are actually effectively apply in the
communication process.
According to these rules for the characterisation of the types of the
mechanisms, we use the experts’ evaluations e.g. as follows: if the
experts’ opinion is that a certain field had been probably fully effectively
exploited in a certain type of mechanism, we quantify this situation with
the digit 1, and if the estimation was that the certain field had probably
not been applied in the mechanism, we denote this state with digit 0; and
if the probability of effective use of the certain type of strategy field in
the certain mechanism was about one half (considering the rate of
distortions, the rate of the used volume of the sub-space etc.), the
calibration value will be .5 etc.
On the basis of Section 3, we classify the strategy spaces of the
mechanisms into main fields A and B and their subfields as follows:
A.   Primary information strategy spaces
A-I Agents primal input information
 A-I-I Economic information
 A-I-II Social information
 A-II Agents’ final output proposals
B. Co-ordinative dual information strategy spaces
B-I Structural institutional co-ordination
  B-I-I Quotas
 B-I-II Transfers
B-II Socio-economic and political co-ordination
 B-II-I Quotas
 B-II-II Transfers
B-III Informational co-ordination
 B-III-I Quotas
 B-III-II Transfers
The experts assessment according to this classification of
available sets of strategies is that it is reasonable to distinguish two
main periods and four sub-periods in the total transformation period of
1987-2006.  These sub-periods are:
I Transitional period: changing incomplete systems - 1987-1997
I-I. sub-period: relaxed dictatorial system - 1987-1991
    I-II. sub-period: incompletely co-ordinated system – 1992-1997
9II.  Accession period co-ordinated system – 1998-2006
II-I. sub-period: under-co-ordinated system ?  1997-2003
II-II. sub-period: bi-co-ordinated system – 2004-2006
The aggregated results of the experts’ assessments are given in
Table 1 below.
According to the expert estimates of the efficiency probability
values , the aggregated failure probabilities of the mechanism may be
defined as their complement values (one subtracted the weighted
average of efficiency probability). Using unit weights, the aggregated
failure probability estimates are approximately as follows:
I.-I. about four-fifths, I.-II. about four-fifths, II.-I. about two-
thirds, II-II. about one-third and in 1987-2006 the summary estimate is
about two-thirds.
4.2.  Analysis of the Changing Types of Estonian Economic
Reforming Mechanisms and their Failures
In this section, we comment on the short- and long-run transformational
changes of the Estonian institutional design mechanism during the
period 1987-2006 and explain some of the mechanism properties and
failures in terms explained in the methodological paragraphs. Most of
the empirical chronological information comes from Ennuste, 2001, pp.
348-357.
I. From the incompletely relaxed central directive system to the under-
co-ordinated decentralised system - 1987-1997: characterisation of
the main types of mechanisms
 I-I. Pre-independence hierarchical incompletely relaxed directive
system - 1987-1991
In the beginning of this sub-period, a directive (dictatorial)
reform mechanism prevailed in Estonia, where the non-central
reforming agents such as committees, ministries, etc. were forced to
announce to the centre their information derived from their
information sets while the centre, based on collected common
information, announced to the agents the final reform plan. The centre
was a compact  monolith  composed of  the Communist Party  Central
Table 1.  Assessments of the Probabilities of Effective Application of Available Strategy Spaces in the Estonian Economic
Reforming Mechanism in Sub-Periods
A. Primary information strategy spaces                             B. Co-ordination information strategy spaces
A-I Agents primal input
information
B-I  Structural institutional
Co-ordination
B-II Socio-economic and political co-
ordination
B-III
Informational
c-ordination
                   Available Strategy Spaces
 Sub-Periods
A-I-I Economic
information
A-I-II Social
information
A-II Agents’
final output
information
B-I-I
Constraints
B-I-II
Transfers
B-II-I
Constraints
B-II-II
Transfers
B-III-I
Constraints
B-III-II
Transfers
I-I. sub-period: relaxed dictatorial
system  - 1987-1991
.4 ~.7 .3 .2 .7 ~.9 - - - - -
I-II. sub-period incompletely co-
ordinated system – 1992-1997
.3 ~.5 .3 ~.6 .7~..9 - - - - - .3
II-I. sub-period: under-co-ordinated
system – 1997-2003
.5 ~.7 .5 .7~.9 - .3 .2 .2 .2 .3
II-II. sub-period: bi-co-ordinated
system  – 2004-2006
.8 ~.9 .6 ~.8 .8 ~.9 .2 ~.5 .5 ~.8 .5 ~.7 .7 ~.8 .3 ~.5 .5 ~.8
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Committee, the Parliament, the Government etc. The reform plan was
theoretically composed by the centre according to the principles of
optimal central planning with the constrained form of result function.
The main constraints on the available reform plan design set and plan
structure were dictated by the constraints forced by the Soviet Union
Central Institutions. These constraints excluded all Western style,
private property and market-orientated reforms.
It is easy to see that this simple mechanism may have produced
reforms at great speed and coherence and enabled long-term
unpopular decisions to be made. But for this mechanism to make
socially desirable reforms, there were two conditions: 1) the centre’s
constrained result function had to be equivalent to the social choice
function, and 2) the agents had to be non-strategic players or
automatic truth-tellers. Neither of these conditions were fulfilled: the
resulting function and strategy basis neglected social dimensions and
the entire system was orientated mainly to enhance the war economy
and the agents manipulated information (Mygind, 1994, 181-184).
According to the Hayekian dictums, this type of mechanism in
the more or less pure form could prevail only under political
dictatorship. As the Gorbatchovian reforms had already started to
dismantle dictatorship, the centralised dictate planning system also
started to disintegrate and some elements of decentralised planning
mechanisms started to blend into this system. The disintegration
started first of all with the relaxation of the result function constraints
and the introduction of some new elements of agents’ strategy spaces,
first of all elements of reform proposals.
Due to the political transition and political pressures on the
centres in the middle of the sub-period, centres had to relax the result
function in the direction of introducing some sporadic institutional
changes towards the market economy. As the political relaxation
allowed for some uninstitutional lobby groups to start parallel
additional competitive informing and advising of the centre, the
quality of the information the centre used improved.
As a result, in the middle and especially at the end of the sub-
period, a plethora of market-orientated, mostly elementary reforms
were speedily accomplished and initiated, among them some
significant reforms in the field of ownership and privatisation (Kein
and Tali, 1995). Understandably, these reform acts were heavily
under-co-ordinated mainly due to the lack of competence of the agents
in the field of design of institutional structures of capitalist market
economies, and procrastinated due to the Moscow-led political
constraints.
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As a result of this situation, many of the enacted reforms needed
immediate repeated amendments (Ennuste, 2001, 348-350). The
reforms were chaotic particularly in the sense of their timing and
sequencing priorities. E.g. a very significant and urgent reform in the
Estonian transition, the introduction of Estonian kroon, was postponed
at least a year (in the sense of secession of Estonian monetary system
from the rouble zone, see Kallas and Sõrg, 1995). With that
procrastination in the dissent from the galloping inflationary Soviet
rouble, certainly great harm was done to the Estonian socio-economic
development.
 I-II. Post-independence decentralised incompletely co-ordinated
system – 1992-1997
Only the adoption of a democratic Constitution and democratic
parliamentary elections in 1992 changed completely the type of the
Estonian economic reforming system. The main elements of the
centralised direct dictate system were replaced by the elements of
decentralised system. Now politically available strategy spaces included
a co-ordinating parameters space for co-ordinating agents with dual
prices, allocative constants etc. and the strategy spaces of the designing
agents now started to contain not only direct private information but also
the information about proposals of the agents for reform designs.
Additional strategy spaces were made available for Western agents:
Washington twins, Estonian émigré elite, Western learning world
lobbies, Western venture investment institutions etc. And the outcome
functions changed from central planning to the equilibrium outcomes of
the reforming institutions.
In this system, the government m ay be modelled as the main co-
ordinating agent (side payments and/or disseminating allocative
constraint information) and the parliament as the final balancing and
socially harmonising agent of reform outcomes.
Both types of the co-ordinating institution s may be modelled as
sub-games containing subagents and game rules.
Understandably, at the beginning, this system was incomplete and
the co-ordination of the enacted reform structures had been evidently
insufficient. According to Lauristin and Vihalemm (1997, 113-116) even
the functioning of the parliamentary procedures were sometimes chaotic
in character.
As a matter of fact, in this sub-period the Estonian parliamentary
democracy, political forces and parliamentary coalitions were not yet
formed based on pivotal electorate interests groups or social groups, say
e.g. left- and rightwing groups, and had not as their primary objective the
protection of certain group interests. The main political objective of the
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main coalitions was the sovereignty, “return to the West”, establishment
of capitalist market economy etc. (Lauristin and Vihalemm, 1997, 113-
116). This led to incomplete play in the role of final co-ordinator and
socially balancing agent of the reform outcomes in the interest of the
society. As a result, in this sub-period, the reforms had been biased and a
failure for the social security sphere in particular (Püss and Aedna, 1995;
Venesaar and Hachey, 1995).
Understandably, the majority voting rule in the parliamentary
procedures could not avoid passing Pareto inferior or socially
undesirable economic reform laws, and Pareto optimal or socially
desirable and balanced laws could have been blocked by an opposing
coalition on the basis of different information.
In this period, among many generally s uccessful market reforms as
the introduction of the Estonian kroon, the Securities Market Act,
establishment of the efficient Privatisation Agency (Ott and Ennuste,
1995) etc. there were socially faulty reforms which were neglecting the
elderly, unemployed, poor (Venesaar and Hachey, 1995) and land tax
reform (Ott, 1999) etc.
We have to remark also that there have been the possibilities of
deforming the co-ordinative information or blocking the co-ordination of
socially optimal decisions in the government by certain interest groups
(Terk, 2000).
II. Accession period co-ordinated system – 1998-2006
II-I. Under-co-ordinated system - 1997-2003
By the beginning of this sub-period, the main types of co-
ordination instruments were nominally applied in the reforming
process but not yet in sufficient quantities, especially considering the
high amount of transitional uncertainties, limited rationality of agents.
Evidently, the truth-telling co-ordination is still working insufficiently
(Ennuste, 1999 and 2001).
The crucial point here was that the increase in institutional
uncertainties and decreasing institutional credibility attributed to rapid
change in Estonian Governments were not sufficiently active in the
stabilising co-ordination processes. The co-ordinations reached in this
kind of governmental processes have been extremely temporary and
have been corrected within short periods many times over and over
again. The long-run co-ordination developments have been a succession
of these preliminary temporary solutions.
Understandably, this led the reform system in some cases to prefer
“too little and too late” and even status quo policies. For agents, the most
preferable wait-and-see strategies and potentially even better course of
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action was the adoption of the suspension of some of the reform process
(Fernandez and Rodric, 1991) or even paralysis of the economic
institutional transition, e.g. Riigikogu passed the Competition Act only in
1998 and the Anti-Corruption Act with big delays only in 1999.
Consequently, to have socially effective changes of the economic
system, the co-ordinating agents have not provided the system with
sufficient credible information about their long-term strategies and
these strategies have not always been concrete enough.
II-II. Hierarchical over-co-ordinated system – 2004-2006
As a prospective member of the European Union from the middle
of 2004, the Estonian economic reform system will be inevitably
exposed to further hierarchical co-ordination by Brussels. This
probably means that there will be further constraints by the quotas
deducted from the evolving acquis communautaire, and the transfers
will be enhanced.
It is easy to see that these changes will be in the direction of
more complicated co-ordination and will make the probabilities of co-
ordination failures more significant and the adaptive economic
institutional design process relatively slower and less flexible. This
may result in some Paretian inefficiencies for the future Estonian
economic reform processes. The latter, especially in the case of a very
small economy still in quite turbulent transformation cycle, the
rationality of relatively more flexible reform approaches is evident.
5.     Conclusions
Theoretical and Methodological
The novel features of our narrative adaptive quasi-implementation
model are that the implementing economic reforming mechanisms and
the economic agents are heterogeneous non-market agents, the
parliament and the government etc. The non-co-operative model
blends the features of Bayes-Nash two-stage game and some elements
of public good and choice theory. Our approach of adaptivity of the
reforming mechanism reacts especially to the problem of transitional
reforming and the expected arrival of new prospective information.
On the basis of heurist ic analysis, we have shown that the
Bayesian-Nash outcomes of the traditional implementation models
may implement the socially desirable economic system transition
"only by accident". This is due to the problematical nature of the
adaptive target of the social choice function, asymmetric information
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of the heterogeneous agents, different objectives of the heterogeneous
agents, difficulties with parliamentary voting decision procedures,
difficulties with impartial co-ordination of the agents by the
government, etc.
To overcome this dead end, we have, first, shown that the
reasonable implementation criterion in the adaptive case is the
criterion of the fulfilment of admissible implementation errors or
probabilities of making sufficient steps in the right direction in the
socially desirable transition paths or corridors. Under this approach,
the crucial problem is no longer the type of socially desirable
correspondence but the properties of the design mechanisms. Our
finding is that there are two necessary elements or conditions for the
quasi-implementing mechanisms: co-ordination of the agents’
decisions (communicativeness) and optimisation in the agents’
decision-making, including consideration of Pareto conditions.
Second, the crucial point here is that in the initial form the social
choice function of the reform design may be in the constrained setting
(e.g. optimal planning model, model with constrained preferences etc.)
and to prepare this kind of function for the permissive implementation
analysis we have to transform it into a relaxed form (with Lagrangean
co-ordination or introducing for agents side constraints or quotas).
Moreover, we have to introduce the co-ordinating transfer system for
the agents to induce them to tell the truth. In other words, we
introduce some kind of co-ordinative agents into the implementation
system to make it effective.
To improve the implementations, a few modest proposals are in
order. First, in the parliamentary decisions the condition of Paretian
optimality should be strictly followed. Second, the transitional
uncertainties should be minimised by taking the decisions (specification
of time limits, and other necessary conditions and avoiding loop-holes in
the laws). And third, the biased influence of particular interest groups in
working out the governmental co-ordination decisions should be
avoided.
Further extension of our methodological design implementation
mechanism results may also be achieved by considering more
complicated economies, e.g. overlapping generation economies under
uncertainty in different market structures. Chattaopadhyay and
Gottardi (1999) considers a general class of pure exchange
overlapping economies under different market structures. The results
by Brusco and Jackson (1999) also offer much interest for extensions
in this field.
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Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis gives rise to the following conclusions.
First, implementation analysis of the changing Estonian economic
reforming mechanisms in 1987-2006 has demonstrated many
implementation inefficiencies and failures in these structures. Mainly
there has been chronically incomplete and under-co-ordination with
constantly distorted information of the reforming agents.
Partly as a result of these mechanism failures, there have been
many chaotic and biased design solutions in the Estonian economic
institutional system transition. The main failures have been in the
sequentially irrational reforms, socially biased reforms, there still
prevails in the socio-political decision-making system circulation of
distorted information that is damaging credibility of reforms and
reinforcing in the current period the tendencies to reform “too little,
too late” etc.
With these failures in the Estonian economic reforming system,
the first step should be to establish co-ordination mechanisms of
stimulating side payments and limiting constraints to enhance truth-
telling as a best strategy for the reforming agents.
Secondly, an intelligent reform strategy is required to give more
room to the strengthening of the position of reforming agents in the
field of designing more efficient social protection institutions in both
in the realm of budgetary and tax policies. The sustainable economic
growth must not be used as an excuse for inaction in this field.
Thirdly, particu lar attention should be devoted to transform the
Estonian economic reforming system into the proper conditions of the
new member state of the European Union, to be encouraged to adopt
efficiently all new effective reforming resources that open up with the
accession and not to stay in the defensive positions.
Notes
1. Bates et al. (1998, p. 12): ”Our use of rational choice and game theory
transforms the narratives into analytic narratives. Our approach therefore
occupies a complex middle ground between ideographic and nomothetic
reasoning.“ In the case of this paper, the use of game theory is changed
for the use of implementation theory. Implementation theory is here
defined as a synthesis of game theory with side co-ordination and
decomposed social optimal planning theory (Ennuste, 1978).
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2. Matsushima (1993) defines social choice function as a pair composed by
a public decision rule and a transfere rule. That means he is explicitly
starting from the co-ordinated type of decision problem.
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